Recently, Wang and Hu have proposed a high-density quadratic compact knapsack publickey cryptosystem using the Chinese remainder theorem to disguise two secret cargo vectors. The system is claimed to be secure against certain known attacks; however, it has not been demonstrated to fulfill any provable security goals. In this work, we show that this system is not secure. Exploiting the special structure of system parameters, we first show that a candidate list for the secret modulus can be obtained by solving linear equations with small solutions. Next, we show that with this candidate list, all other secrets can be recovered in succession with lattice-based methods by solving certain modular linear equations with small solutions. As a result, recovering a private key can be done in about 11 h for the proposed system parameter n = 100. We also discuss a method to thwart the proposed attack.
Introduction
Recently, a quadratic compact knapsack public-key cryptosystem has been proposed by Wang and Hu [1] . The scheme uses two secret cargo vectors A and B with a special structure such that some entries of A and B have only small factors.
These two vectors are used to make a public cargo vector F with a matrix C = (c ij ) 2×2 by using the Chinese remainder theorem and modular multiplication in order to scramble cargo vectors and conceal its special structure. Interestingly, this scheme does not use a binary message. Instead, it uses a message M = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) with m i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 15} that is encrypted into a ciphertext c such that c = ∑ n i=1 f i m 2 i , where F = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a public cargo vector. Using a nonbinary message, this scheme seems resistant to low-density attacks. Other known attacks are also considered, including the Diophantine approximation attack and the orthogonal lattice attack; however, it has not been demonstrated to fulfill any provable security goals. In some sense, this scheme can be viewed as a CRT-variant of a previous knapsack-based probabilistic encryption scheme [2] , where only one secret cargo vector is used and some entries have only small factors. Due to the special structure, it is cryptanalyzed by Youssef [3] , where it is shown that a short candidate list for the secret modulus can be found in time complexity O(n can be recovered with lattice-based methods finding small solutions of certain modular multivariate linear equations. We also discuss how to thwart the proposed attack.
We note that Youssef already attacked this scheme in [5] where a heuristic stereotyped message attack is done to recover the plaintext message when partial information about the original message is known. The attack in [5] does not use any internal structure of the secret key. In contrast, we use the special property of secret cargo vectors to recover the secret key, and decryption can be done with the obtained secret key.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some preliminaries for understanding the proposed attack. The key generation algorithm from the scheme presented in [1] is reviewed in Section 3. In Section 4, we present a main observation on which our attack is based, and the proposed attack is presented with experimental results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains a brief conclusion.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review lattices and present some facts from number theory that are used in the rest of the paper.
Notation
Throughout this paper, the following notation is used. The greatest common divisor (GCD) of two integers a and b is denoted by gcd(a, b). For a set or list L, the cardinality or length of L is denoted by |L|. We write the binary length of an integer a as |a| 2 . Finally, the smallest integer greater than or equal to r ∈ R is denoted by ⌈r⌉.
Lattices
An n-dimensional lattice is the set of integer combinations The lattice generated by B is denoted by L(B).
One of the most important algorithmic problems in lattices is the shortest vector problem (SVP), which is to find the shortest non-zero vector in a given lattice. Only exponential time algorithms [6] [7] [8] are known for this problem, and polynomial time algorithms such as LLL achieve only exponential approximation factors although they behave much better in practice. For a small dimension, such as when n < 50, SVP can be solved efficiently by algorithms presented in [7, 8] .
One of the applications of lattices is in finding small solutions of (modular) linear multivariate equations. For a general modular equation a 1 x 1 + · · · + a n x n ≡ 0(mod N), where all a i s and N are known, lattice-based methods can be used to find a small solution (x 1 , . . . , x n ) of this equation whenever ∏ n i=1 X i ≤ N, where X 1 , . . . , X n > 0 are integers such that |x 1 | ≤ X 1 , . . . , |x n | ≤ X n . This folklore result is justified in [9, Appendix A]. The non-modular case can also be solved under a similar condition [10, Chapter 2].
An integer linear equation with two variables
In this section, we review how to find solutions of the integer linear equation with two variables, namely,
First, note that there exist integer solutions of (1) 
Next, we find solutions in the bounded region,
Since f (x, y) = 0 is a line, for this line to intersect with the region, at least one of f (0, 0)f (X, Y ) and f (X, 0)f (0, Y ) should be non-positive. In this case, to find solutions in the region, we follow the procedure described below. Similarly, one can start from the solution near the x-axis, x = X , or y = Y . All starting points produce the same solution set in the region, and so a choice can be made according to the given equation. This may not be the most efficient method; however, it is adequate for our purpose.
Description of the encryption scheme
In this section, we describe a quadratic compact knapsack public-key cryptosystem [1] . We first describe the key generation algorithm. For the key generation, let J consist of the following integer pairs and their reverse pairs: (1, 31), (1, 34) , (1, 37) , (1, 38) , (1, 41) , (1, 43) , (1, 46) , (1, 47) , (1, 53) , (1, 58) , (1, 59) , (1, 61) , (1, 62) , (1, 67) , (1, 68) , (1, 71) , (1, 73) , (1, 74) , (1, 76) , (1, 78) , (1, 79) , (1, 82) , (1, 83) , (1, 86) , (1, 87) , (1, 89) , (1, 92) , (1, 93) , (1, 94) , (1, 97) , (2, 17) , (2, 19) , (2, 23) , (2, 29) , (2, 31) , (2, 34) , (2, 37) , (2, 38) , (2, 39) , (2, 41) , (2, 43) , (2, 46) , (2, 47) , (3, 26) , (3, 29) , (3, 31) , (4, 17) , (4, 19) , (4, 23) , (6, 13) . Then two cargo vectors A and B are generated by the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 ([1, Algorithm 2]).
1. Randomly choose n − 1 integer pairs g
. . , n with repetition permitted. 2. Randomly choose 2(n − 1) numbers s 1 , . . . , s n−1 and t 1 , . . . , t n−1 satisfying the following requirements. (1) 
4. Output A = (a 1 , . . . , a n ), B = (b 1 , . . . , b n ), and exit.
It is suggested that |s
In this way, a 1 , . . . , a n have almost the same binary length. Similarly, b 1 , . . . , b n have almost the same binary length. In addition, s i and t i have the binary length,
which is used to bound the range of s i and t i during the attack procedure. Now we describe the key generation algorithm.
Key generation.
Randomly choose two cargo vectors
2. Randomly choose a matrix C = (c ij ) 2×2 with determinant 1 and the length of its entries upper-bounded by a constant, that is
and write the inverse of C as C
 .
Randomly choose two prime integers p and q slightly greater than 225
∑ n i=1â i and 225
∑ n i=1b i respectively, and compute N = pq. 5. Use the Chinese remainder theorem to generate a cargo vector E = (e 1 , . . . , e n ), s.t. e i ≡â i mod p, e i ≡b i mod q.
Randomly choose an invertible integer
The private key is N, p, q, C −1 , and v −1 mod N, and the public key is a (permuted) vector of F , where permutation can be used to increase security.
For the decryption procedure, we refer to [1] . In the rest of the paper, we assume a public key
. . , f n ) without permutation for the convenience of presentation. Of course, permutation is considered during the complexity analysis.
Main observation
We begin with a main observation that there exist small integers
This leads to the following lemma, which is used in the first step of the attack. Proof. From the key generation algorithm, we know that the following equations hold,
where C = (c ij ) 2×2 , N = pq. By the Chinese remainder theorem, there exist c
Using (2), we rewrite f n , . . . , f n−3 as
To remove G 2 from the equations, we manipulate the above equations as
where
Similarly, we can obtain the following equations:
which means that 
satisfies (4). The remaining Eqs. (5) and (6) can be checked by simple substitution. Note that the absolute value of W i is small, namely
Now we are ready to describe the proposed attack.
The proposed attack

Description of the attack
The proposed attack is performed in several steps. Only the public key and restrictions imposed on the system parameters are used in this attack. In brief, we use Lemma 1 to derive a candidate list for N. Then we show how to obtain g ′ ij in succession. With this obtained information, it is possible to compute all secret values. Now we describe and explain the attack procedure step by step.
Step 1. W i s such that W
With a given public key F = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), the attack begins by finding small integers W i such that
which are expected to satisfy the following equations:
By Lemma 1, such W i s exist. To identify such integers, lattice reduction algorithms are used with a lattice L(B) generated by the following matrix:
where M is a large integer. The smallest vector in this lattice is expected to be (W 0 , W 1 , W 2 , W 3 , 0). We chose M to be 10 10 , which seems adequate, and we used the BKZ algorithm 1 implemented in NTL [11] to find the shortest vector in a lattice. Since we only know a permuted vector of a public key, lattice reduction is done for all combinations. Thus, it is done
times, and the attack procedure continues with the vector (W 0 , W 1 , W 2 , W 3 , 0) that has the smallest norm. Given a vector, all 4! permutations are tested in the next steps. If this does not result in the private key, the vector with the next smallest norm should be tried. In experiments, we were able to recover the secret key using the smallest norm vector except one case. 2 In the next steps, we assume knowledge of f n , . . . , f n−3 and W i s, which are expected to satisfy (11) and (12).
Step 2. A set of 6-tuples
In this step, we find solutions for (11) . Namely, we find a set L such that
, and
The range for u i comes from the binary length of s n−i in (3).
To find such a set, for all possible values g 2 , g 3 , g 4 ∈ K and u 1 (0 < u 1 < U 1 ), the corresponding values u 2 and u 3 are found by solving the integer linear equation:
. All integer solutions of this equation can be found using an extended Euclidean algorithm as is explained in Section 2.3. The set L consists of all solutions with corresponding g 2 , g 3 , g 4 and u 1 as 6-tuples. Note that (11) and (12) have the same solutions.
Step 3. A set of pairs of 6-tuples
In this step, we identify solutions satisfying both (11) and (12) . This means that (g
∈ J} using L obtained in the previous step. To do that, we make a partition of L indexed by (g 2 , g 3 , g 4 ) , and obtain pairs for all elements in J × J × J. Note that these are candidates for g ′ ij , s n−k , and t n−k for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. V 2 ) , where V 1 and V 2 are from (9) and (10). We know that N is a product of two large primes and should be larger than any f i . Thus, for a pair in L ′ , let N be gcd(V 1 , V 2 ) divided by small prime divisors, if it exists. If N is prime or not larger than (max n i=1 f i ), we move on to the next pair. Otherwise, we try to find the corresponding g ′ ij for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and we move on to the next pair if we fail. At least for one pair in L ′ , we succeed if W i s are correct. Note that g ′ ij , s n−k , and t n−k are already known from L ′ for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In the following, we now explain a method to obtain g
Step 4. Candidate N and g
Then f n and f n−1 can be rewritten as
Solving this system yields G 
Thus, G ′ i4 and G ′ i5 can also be computed using g
. Now in order to obtain the rest of G ′ ij , let us rewrite f i as
In this equation, s i and t i are much smaller than other values that have almost the same binary length as N. In fact, s i and t i are smaller than p and q, and they have the binary length at most With respect to complexity, note that this step needs lattice reductions at most |J|n 2 times for each candidate N.
Step 5. A private key
In this final step, the private key (C 
Note that c With this obtained information, the remaining secrets c
, v, and v −1 mod N can be computed easily. After testing with encryption and decryption, we can be sure that the private key obtained is the correct key.
In summary, f n , . . . , f n−3 are found in Step 1, and candidates for g ′ ij , s n−k , t n−k for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} are obtained in Steps 2 and 3. In Step 4, using these candidates, N, g ′ ij , and f k are computed. In the final step, the correct private
We briefly analyze the time complexity of this attack in the next section. 
Complexity analysis
• Step 1. Lattice reduction of a 4-dimensional lattice is done about n 4 times in this step. Since |f i | 2 grows linearly with n and lattice reduction can be done in quadratic complexity [12] , the time complexity of this step is O(n 6 ).
• 
, which seems to be plausible, this step can be done in time complexity of O(n 5 ).
• Step 5. This final step is done in constant time.
Overall, our attack works in time complexity O(n 6 ) with heuristic assumptions for a practical value of n (≥100). One may argue that for the very large key size, the proposed attack might be ineffective since it is O(n 6 ); however, the scheme would be inefficient also. For example, one needs very large n ≈ 2 80/6 ≈ 10 321 to provide comparable security to 1024-bit RSA.
In the following, we present experimental results which shows the effectiveness of the proposed attack.
Experiments
We implemented the proposed attack with n from 50 to 200. The required time for each instance is shown in Table 1 . Experiments were done on a Q9550 (2.83 GHz) using only one core. As the result shows, our attack is practical. It breaks the cryptosystem in about 11 h for the recommended parameter n = 100. Even when n = 200, the proposed attack recovers the secret key within 4 days. Note that the timings heavily depend on the number of candidates for N. However, for random keys, it is not too large and within reach even when n = 200 which is twice the suggested parameter. This clearly demonstrates that this scheme is completely insecure in the current form.
Discussion
The security failure of this scheme is mainly due to the secret cargo vectors A and B. In particular, a n and b n are products of elements only in some small set K , since s n = t n = 1. If we set s n and t n to be random integers such that they are too large to be guessed, it would be harder to attack this scheme. In fact, if s n ≈ t n ≈ 2 n , our attack fails in Step 2; however, some information about the permutation could be leaked in this case. To avoid such leakage, s n and t n should be larger than that.
Recall that W i (≈ 2s n−3 t n−3 ) was found satisfying 1/3 , we need to make |W i | large enough, such that
